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ABSTRACT
Our paper approaches the parking assistance service in
urban environments as an instance of service provision in
non-cooperative network environments. We propose norma-
tive abstractions for the way drivers pursue parking space
and the way they respond to partial or complete informa-
tion for parking demand and supply as well as specific pric-
ing policies on public and private parking facilities. The
drivers are viewed as strategic agents who make rational de-
cisions attempting to minimize the cost of the acquired park-
ing spot. We formulate the resulting games as resource se-
lection games and derive their equilibria under different ex-
pressions of uncertainty about the overall parking demand.
The efficiency of the equilibrium states is compared against
the optimal assignment that could be determined by a cen-
tralized entity and conditions are derived for minimizing the
related price of anarchy value. Our results provide useful
hints for the pricing and practical management of on-street
and private parking resources. More importantly, they ex-
emplify counterintuitive less-is-more effects about the way
information availability modulates the service cost, which
underpin general competitive service provision settings and
contribute to the better understanding of effective informa-
tion mechanisms.
Keywords
Parking assistance service, vehicular networks, parking
games, uncertainty, price of anarchy
1. INTRODUCTION
In various mobile applications, networked entities (i.e.,
agents) are called to autonomously decide on how to
best coexist with each other in the network, i.e., coop-
erate with and/or compete against eachother, to opti-
mally serve their interests. The agents’ co-action may
actually take various forms and pertain to different net-
work functions depending on the particular network
paradigm. For example, in autonomic networks, each
agent (node) is called to decide whether to dispose or
not its own scarce resources (i.e., energy, bandwidth
and storage space) in favor of others’ welfare, anticipat-
ing their support in due course. Other instances explic-
itly discriminate between the resource/service provider
and resource/service consumer; namely, there is a network-
external operator that manages the service provision
and a number of user nodes that seek to get access to
it at minimum cost. This paper attempts to delineate
and explore the dynamics that arise in this last type of
competitive settings.
A crucial determinant for these dynamics is the in-
formation different nodes possess about the service re-
source availability and the demand for it. Indeed, any
such information becomes an asset that shapes the nodes’
behavior and modulates their incentive to compete. The
information factor affects the final outcome of nodes’ in-
teractions, and, eventually, the benefit that is accrued
by them as well as the service provider, e.g., her income
when she charges her service. Technically, this informa-
tion may be announced centrally, even by the service
provider herself, or opportunistically collected by and
distributed among the network of service consumers.
These competitive contexts are well captured in auction-
based frameworks [1][3]. In general, sellers-auctioneers
draw on auction mechanisms to allocate both divisi-
ble and non-divisible resources among multiple agents,
with the aim to maximize either their own revenue or
the social welfare. Typically, the auctioneer avails pri-
vate information on the auction set-up that, when pub-
lished, can modulate the bidders’ strategies, escalating
or moderating competition, and hence determining the
outcome of the auction procedure, i.e., resource winners
and their payments [22][8].
In this paper we study another instance of competi-
tive service provision involving vehicular nodes within
urban environments: the parking assistance service. Ve-
hicle drivers seek and compete for the cheaper but scarce
on-street parking space, while the parking service provider
aims at maximizing the parking capacity utilization and
his revenue. As with auctions, the information about
the resources and the demand for them may vary and
shape the behavior of competing agents. On the one
hand, the parking service provider may collect and broad-
cast different amounts of information to the drivers;
whereas, vehicles may exploit wireless communication
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and information sensing technologies to gain themselves
partial knowledge about the location and/or vacancy of
parking spots.
The way the opportunistic exchange of information
among vehicles may sharpen competition is studied in
[16] and [13]. In [16], Kokolaki et al. simulate a fully co-
operative opportunistic parking space assistance scheme,
whereby each parking spot is equipped with a sensor
device providing information about its occupancy sta-
tus. It is shown that the full exchange of information
upon encounters of vehicles may give rise to synchro-
nization effects (vehicles are steered towards similar lo-
cations), sharpen competition, and eventually render
the search process inefficient. Anticipating this effect,
Delot et al. propose in [13] a distributed virtual parking
space reservation mechanism, whereby vehicles vacating
a parking spot selectively distribute this information to
their proximity. Hence, they mitigate the competition
for the scarce parking spots by controlling the diffusion
of the parking information among drivers.
Drawing on the parking search assistance service, our
paper seeks to systematically explore a broader phe-
nomenon, evidenced in several instances of service pro-
vision within non-cooperative networking environments:
the double-edged impact of information on the overall
service efficiency, i.e., its assistance with resource/service
discovery, on the one hand, and the sharpening of com-
petition for it, on the other. Questions we address
are: How do different types of information (complete or
partial) on the parking demand and supply modulate
drivers’ incentive to compete? How does such informa-
tion affect the cost that drivers incur and the revenue
accruing for the parking service operator?
We take a game-theoretic approach and view the drivers
as rational selfish agents that pursue to minimize the
cost they will pay for acquired parking space. The
drivers choose to either compete for the cheaper but
scarce on-street parking spots or head for the more ex-
pensive private parking lot. In the first case, they run
the risk of failing to get a spot and having to a pos-
teriori take the more expensive alternative, this time
suffering the additional cruising cost in terms of time,
fuel consumption (and stress) of the failured attempt.
Drivers make their decisions drawing on information of
variable accuracy about the parking demand (number
of drivers) and supply (number of parking spots and
pricing policy), which is broadcast from the parking ser-
vice operator. With this common knowledge at hand,
drivers react rationally seeking to minimize the cost of
their decisions. The announced information impacts on
the resulting driver interaction and ultimately the total
cost paid. Thus, its systematic manipulation provides
useful hints for the realization of effective centralized
information mechanisms.
We formulate the parking spot selection problem as
an instance of resource selection games, abstracting from
spatial and temporal variations in parking demand and
supply, in Section 2. We then analyze the game variant
with complete information about parking demand in
Section 3, where we derive the equilibrium behaviors of
the drivers and compare the induced social cost against
the optimal one via the Price of Anarchy metric, leaving
proofs for the Appendix. We relax the assumption for
the availability of complete information and derive the
corresponding analysis in Section 4. Indeed, in Section
5, we show that the optimization of the equilibrium so-
cial cost is feasible by properly choosing the charging
cost and the location of the private parking facilities.
Less intuitively, assessing the impact of information, we
present less-is-more phenomena arguing that partial in-
formation maximizes drivers benefit, compared to com-
plete knowledge. We outline related research in Section
6 and we close the discussion in Section 7, drawing par-
allels between the game-theoretic assertions for drivers’
behavior and insights from the cognitive psychology do-
main.
2. THEPARKING SPOT SELECTIONGAME
In the parking spot selection game, the set of players
consists of drivers who circulate within the center area
of a big city in search of parking space. Typically, in
these regions, parking is completely forbidden or con-
strained in whole areas of road blocks so that the real
effective curbside is significantly limited (see Fig. 1).
The drivers have to decide whether to drive towards
the scarce low-cost (controlled) public parking spots or
the more expensive private parking lot (we see all local
lots collectively as one). All parking spots that lie in
the same public or private area are assumed to be of
the same value for the players –we discuss this assump-
tion further in Section 7. Thus, the decisions are made
on the two sets of parking spots rather than individ-
ual set items. The two sets jointly suffice to serve all
parking requests.
We observe drivers’ behavior within a particular time
window over which they reach this parking area. In gen-
eral, these synchronization phenomena in drivers’ flow
occur at specific time zones during the day [2]. Herein,
we account for morning hours or driving in the area for
business purposes coupled with long parking duration.
Thus, the collective decision making on parking space
selection can be formulated as an instance of the strate-
gic resource selection games, whereby N players (i.e.,
drivers) compete against each other for a finite num-
ber of common resources (i.e., public parking spots)
[6]. More formally, the one-shot parking spot selection
game is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A Parking Spot Selection Game is
a tuple Γ(N) = (N ,R, (wj)j∈(pub,priv)), where:
2
Figure 1: Parking and geographical map (thanks to Google maps) of the centre area of a big European
city. Dashed lines show metered controlled (public) parking spots, whereas “P” denotes private
parking facilities. The map illustrates, as well, the capacity of both parking options.
• N = {1, ..., N}, N > 1 is the set of drivers who
seek for parking space,
• R = Rpub ∪Rpriv is the set of parking spots; Rpub
is the set of public spots, with R = |Rpub| ≥ 1;
Rpriv the set of private spots, with |Rpriv| ≥ N ,
• Ai = {public, private}, is the action set for each
driver i ∈ N ,
• wpub() and wpriv() are the cost functions of the two
actions, respectively1.
The parking spot selection game comes under the
broader family of congestion games2. The players’ pay-
offs (here: costs) are non-decreasing functions of the
number of players competing for the parking capacity
rather than their identities and common to all play-
ers. More specifically, drivers who decide to compete
for the public parking space undergo the risk of not be-
ing among the R winner-drivers to get a public spot. In
this case, they have to eventually resort to private park-
ing space, only after wasting extra time and fuel (plus
patience supply) on the failed attempt. The expected
cost of the action public, wpub : A1 × ... × AN → R, is
therefore a function of the number of drivers k taking
it, and is given by
wpub(k) = min(1, R/k)cpub,s + (1−min(1, R/k))cpub,f (1)
1Note that the cost functions are defined over the action set
of each user; in the original definition of resource selection
games in [6], cost functions are defined over the resources
but the resource set coincides with the action set.
2Readers who are more familiar with game theory will notice
a resemblance to the atomic variant of Pigou’s selfish routing
example [24]. Pigou’s paths correspond to the two parking
alternatives, one having a high user-independent use cost
and the other a cost that scales with the number of users
(albeit not linearly).
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Figure 2: The cost functions for public and pri-
vate parking space: R = 50, cpub,s = 1.
where cpub,s is the cost of successfully competing for
public parking space, whereas cpub,f = γ · cpub,s, γ > 1,
is the cost of competing, failing, and eventually paying
for private parking space.
On the other hand, the cost of private parking space
is fixed
wpriv(k) = cpriv = β · cpub,s (2)
where 1 < β < γ, so that the excess cost δ · cpub,s,
with δ = γ − β > 0, reflects the actual cost of cruis-
ing and the “virtual” cost of wasted time till eventually
heading to the private parking space. Figure 2 plots the
cost functions against the number of drivers, for both
parking options, under different charging schemes.
We denote every action profile with the vector a =
(ai, a−i) ∈ ×Nk=1Ak, where a−i denotes the actions of
all other drivers but player i in the profile a. Besides
the two pure strategies coinciding with the pursuit of
public and private parking space, the drivers may also
randomize over them. In particular, if ∆(Ai) is the
set of probability distributions over the action set of
player i, a player’s mixed action corresponds to a vector
p = (ppub, ppriv) ∈ ∆(Ai), where ppub and ppriv are the
probabilities of the pure actions, with ppub + ppriv = 1,
while its cost is a weighted sum of the cost functions
wpub() and wpriv() of the pure actions.
In this game-theoretic formulation, the drivers are as-
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sumed to be rational strategic players. They explicitly
consider the presence of identical counter-actors that
also make rational decisions, weight the costs related to
every possible action profile, and act as cost-minimizers.
In doing so, they usually do not avail precise informa-
tion about the actual demand, i.e., competition, for
parking resources. In the following sections, we analyze
the parking selection game under different levels of un-
certainty for the overall parking demand, ranging from
the highly optimistic scenario of complete knowledge to
one of high uncertainty about it. In all cases, we look
into both the stable and optimal operational conditions
and the respective costs incurred by the players.
3. COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF PARK-
ING DEMAND
Ideally, the players determine their strategy under
complete knowledge of those parameters that shape their
cost. Given the symmetry of the game, the additional
piece of information that is considered available to the
players, besides the number of vacant parking spots and
the employed pricing policy, is the level of parking de-
mand, i.e., the number of drivers searching for parking
space. We draw on concepts from [18] and theoretical
results from [6, 12] to derive the equilibrium strategies
for the game Γ(N) and assess their (in)efficiency.
3.1 Pure Equilibria strategies
Existence: The parking spot selection game consti-
tutes a symmetric game, where the action set is common
to all players and consists of two possible actions, public
and private. Cheng et al. have shown in ([12], Theo-
rem 1) that every symmetric game with two strategies
has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Computation: Thanks to the game’s symmetry, the
full set of 2N different action profiles maps intoN+1 dif-
ferent action meta-profiles. Each meta-profile a(m),m ∈
[0, N ] encompasses all
(
N
m
)
different action profiles that
result in the same number of drivers competing for on-
street parking space. The expected costs for these m
drivers and for the N−m ones choosing directly the pri-
vate parking lot alternative are functions of a(m) rather
than the exact action profile.
In general, the cost cNi (ai, a−i) for the driver i under
the action profile a = (ai, a−i) is
cNi (ai, a−i) =
{
wpub(σpub(a)), for ai = public
wpriv(N − σpub(a)), for ai = private (3)
where σpub(a) is the number of competing drivers
for on-street parking under action profile a. Equilib-
ria action profiles combine the players’ best-responses
to their opponents’ actions. Formally, the action profile
a = (ai, a−i) is a pure Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N :
ai ∈ arg min
a′i∈Ai
(cNi (a
′
i, a−i)) (4)
so that no player has anything to gain by changing her
decision unilaterally.
Therefore, to derive the equilibria states, we locate
the conditions on σpub that break the equilibrium defi-
nition and reverse them. More specifically, given an ac-
tion profile a with σpub(a) competing drivers, a player
gains by changing her decision to play action ai in two
circumstances:
when ai = private and wpub(σpub(a)+1) < cpriv (5)
when ai = public and wpub(σpub(a)) > cpriv (6)
Taking into account the relation between the number
of drivers and the available on-street parking spots, R,
we can postulate the following Lemma:
Lemma 3.1. In the parking spot selection game Γ(N),
a driver is motivated to change his action ai in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
• ai = private and σpub(a) < R ≤ N or (7)
R ≤ σpub(a) < σ0 − 1 ≤ N or (8)
σpub(a) < N ≤ R (9)
• ai = public and R < σ0 < σpub(a) ≤ N (10)
where σ0 =
R(γ−1)
δ ∈ R.
Proof. Conditions (7) and (9) are trivial. Since the
current number of competing vehicles is less than the
on-street parking capacity, every driver having origi-
nally chosen the private parking option has the incen-
tive to change her decision due to the price differential
between cpub,s and cpriv.
When σpub(a) exceeds the public parking supply, as
in (8), a driver who has decided to avoid competition,
profits from switching her action when the expected cost
of playing public becomes less than the fixed cost of
playing private. From (3) and (5), it must hold that:
R
σpub(a) + 1
· cpub,s + (1−
R
σpub(a) + 1
) · cpub,f < cpriv ⇒
σpub(a) <
R(γ − 1)
δ
− 1
which yields (8).
On the contrary, a driver that first decides to compete
for public parking space, switches to private if the com-
peting drivers outnumber the public parking resources.
Namely, from (3) and (6), when
R
σpub(a)
· cpub,s + (1−
R
σpub(a)
) · cpub,f > cpriv ⇒
σpub(a) >
R(γ − 1)
δ
inline with (10).
It is now possible to state the following Theorem for
the pure Nash equilibria of the parking spot selection
game.
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Theorem 3.1. A parking spot selection game has:
• one Nash equilibrium a∗ with σpub(a∗) = σNE,1pub =
N , if N ≤ σ0 and σ0 ∈ R
• ( Nbσ0c) Nash equilibrium profiles a′ with σpub(a′) =
σNE,2pub = bσ0c, if N > σ0 and σ0 ∈ (R,N)\N∗
• (Nσ0) Nash equilibrium profiles a′ with σpub(a′) =
σNE,2pub = σ0 and
(
N
σ0−1
)
Nash equilibrium profiles
a? with σpub(a
?) = σNE,3pub = σ0− 1, if N > σ0 and
σ0 ∈ [R+ 1, N ] ∩ N∗.
Proof. Theorem 3.1 follows directly from (4) and
Lemma 3.1. The game has two equilibrium conditions
on σpub for N > σ0 with integer σ0, or a unique equi-
librium condition, otherwise.
In the Appendix, we provide an alternative way to
derive the equilibria of Γ(N) via potential functions.
Efficiency: The efficiency of the equilibria action
profiles resulting from the strategically selfish decisions
of the drivers is assessed through the broadly used met-
ric of the Price of Anarchy [18]. It expresses the ratio of
the social cost in the worst-case equilibria over the opti-
mal social cost under ideal coordination of the driver’s
strategies.
Proposition 3.1. In the parking spot selection game,
the pure Price of Anarchy equals:
PoA =

γN−(γ−1) min(N,R)
min(N,R)+βmax(0,N−R) , if σ0 ≥ N
bσ0cδ−R(γ−1)+βN
R+β(N−R) , if σ0 < N
Proof. The social cost under action profile a equals:
C(σpub(a)) =
N∑
i=1
cNi (a) =
cpub,s(Nβ − σpub(a)(β − 1)), if σpub(a) ≤ R and (11)
cpub,s(σpub(a)δ −R(γ − 1) + βN), if R < σpub(a) ≤ N
The numerators of the two ratios are obtained di-
rectly by replacing the first two σNEpub values (worst-
cases) computed in Theorem 3.1. On the other hand,
under the ideal action profile aopt, exactlyR drivers pur-
sue on-street parking, whereas the remaining N−R are
served by the private parking resources. Therefore, un-
der aopt, no drivers find themselves in the unfortunate
situation to have to pay the additional cost of cruising
in terms of time and fuel after having unsuccessfully
competed for an on-street parking spot. The optimal
social cost, Copt is given by:
Copt =
N∑
i=1
cNi (aopt) = cpub,s[min(N,R) + β ·max(0, N −R)]
(12)
Corollary 3.1. In the parking spot selection game,
the pure Price of Anarchy equals 1
1− (β−1)RβN
, if N > σ0
and σ0 ∈ [R+ 1, N ] ∩ N∗.
Proof. From Theorem 3.1, for integer σ0 and N >
σ0 there are two sets of equilibria profiles with σ
NE,2
pub =
σ0 and σ
NE,3
pub = σ0 − 1. The social costs at these pro-
files are cpub,s · Nβ and cpub,s · (Nβ − δ), respectively.
Since β > 1 and δ > 0, the highest social cost, which
determines the PoA ratio, is paid in the first case.
Proposition 3.2. In the parking spot selection game,
the pure Price of Anarchy is upper-bounded by 11−R/N
with N > R.
Proof. From Proposition 3.1, when N ≤ σ0,
PoA =
γN −R(γ − 1)
R+ β(N −R) =
γ − δσ0/N
R+β(N−R)
N
≤ β
β − R
N
(β − 1) <
1
1−R/N
Similarly, when N > σ0,
PoA =
bσ0cδ −R(γ − 1) + βN
R+ β(N −R) ≤
1
1−R (β−1)
Nβ
<
1
1−R/N
3.2 Mixed-action equilibria strategies
We mainly draw our attention on symmetric mixed-
action equilibria since these can be more helpful in dic-
tating practical strategies in real systems. Asymmetric
mixed-action equilibria are discussed in the end of the
Section.
Existence: Ashlagi, Monderer, and Tennenholtz proved
in ([6], Theorem 1) that a unique symmetric mixed equi-
librium exists for the broader family of resource selec-
tion games with more than two players and increas-
ing cost functions. It is trivial to repeat their proof
and confirm this result for our parking spot selection
game Γ(N), with N > R and cost functions wpub(·) and
wpriv(·) that are non-decreasing functions of the num-
ber of players (increasing and constant, respectively).
Computation: If we denote by
B(σpub;N, ppub) =
(
N
σpub
)
p
σpub
pub (1− ppub)N−σpub (13)
the probability distribution of the number of drivers
that decide to compete for on-street parking spots, where
p = (ppub, ppriv) denotes a mixed-action, then
cNi (public, p) =
N−1∑
σpub=0
wpub(σpub + 1)B(σpub;N − 1, ppub)
cNi (private, p) = cpriv
denote the expected costs of choosing the on-street
(resp. private) parking space option when all other
drivers play the mixed-action p, while
cNi (p, p) = ppub · cNi (public, p) + ppriv · cNi (private, p) (14)
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is the cost of the symmetric profile where everyone
plays the mixed-action p.
With these at hand, we can now postulate the follow-
ing Theorem.
Theorem 3.2. The parking spot selection game Γ(N)
has a unique symmetric mixed-action Nash equilibrium
pNE = (pNEpub , p
NE
priv), where:
• pNEpub = 1, if N ≤ σ0 and
• pNEpub = σ0N , if N > σ0,
where pNEpub = 1− pNEpriv and σ0 ∈ R.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Asymmetric mixed-action equilibria: In the anal-
ysis of pure equilibria in Section 3.1, we showed that
there are multiple asymmetric pure equilibria, when the
number of drivers exceeds the σ0. In general, the deriva-
tion of results for asymmetric mixed-action equilibria is
much harder than for either their pure or their symmet-
ric counterparts since the search space is much larger.
Moreover, asymmetric mixed-equilibria have two more
undesirable properties: a) they do not treat all play-
ers equally, i.e., different players end up with a-priori
worse chances to come up with a cheap parking spot; b)
their realization in practical situations is a much more
difficult than their symmetric counterparts.
Therefore, in this and subsequent Sections, we base
our analysis and discussion on symmetric equilibria and
their (in)efficiency.
4. INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PARKING DEMAND
The availability of complete information about the
drivers’ (i.e., players’) population is a fairly strong and
unrealistic assumption. In this Section we relax it by
studying two game variants with incomplete informa-
tion, where the players either share common probabilis-
tic information about the overall parking demand or are
totally uncertain about it. Note that the parking service
operator may, depending on the network and informa-
tion sensing infrastructure at her disposal, provide the
competing drivers with different amounts of information
about the demand for parking space (e.g., historical sta-
tistical data about the utilization of on-street parking
space).
4.1 Probabilistic knowledge of parking demand
In the Bayesian model of the game, the drivers deter-
mine their actions on the basis of private information,
their types. The type in this game is a binary vari-
able indicating whether a driver is in search of park-
ing space (active player). Every driver knows her own
type along with the strategy space, the cost functions,
and the possible types of all others. However, she ig-
nores the real state of the game at a particular moment
in time, as expressed by the types of the other play-
ers, and, hence, she cannot deterministically reason out
the actions being played. Instead, she draws on com-
mon prior probabilistic information about the activity
of drivers to derive estimates about the expected cost
of her actions.
Formally, the Bayesian parking spot selection game
is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. A Bayesian Parking Spot Selection
Game is a tuple
ΓB(N) = (N ,R, (wj)j∈(pub,priv), (Ai)i∈N , (Θi)i∈N , fΘ),
comprising:
• N and R, as defined for Γ(N),
• Ai = {public, private,}, the set of potential ac-
tions for each driver i ∈ N ,
• Θi = {0, 1}, the set of types for each driver i ∈
N , where 1 stands for active and 0 for inactive
drivers,
• Si : Θi → Ai, the set of possible strategies for each
driver i ∈ N ,
• cNBi (s(ϑ), ϑ), the cost functions for each driver i ∈
N , for every type profile ϑ ∈ ×Nk=1Θk and strategy
profile s(ϑ) ∈ ×Nk=1Sk,
• fΘ, the prior joint probability distribution of the
drivers’ activity.
In ΓB(N), all inactive drivers abstain from the game
interaction; hence, si(ϑi = 0) = . On the contrary,
si(ϑi = 1) ∈ {public, private}, with the active play-
ers also randomizing over this subset of Ai choosing
mixed-actions. The game is symmetric when, besides
the action set, drivers share the same activity distribu-
tion. The real number of active players upon each time
depends on their types and is given by nact =
∑
k ϑk.
The action profile is the effect of players’ strategies on
their types and is noted as a = (s(ϑ), ϑ) ∈ ×Nk=1Ak.
The cost cNBi (s(ϑ), ϑ) for the active driver i under the
type profile ϑ and the strategy profile s(ϑ) is
c
NB
i (s(ϑ), ϑ) = c
NB
i (si(ϑi), s−i(ϑ−i), ϑi, ϑ−i) (15)
Equilibria: For the Bayesian parking spot selection
game, the strategy profile s′ ∈ ×Nk=1Sk(ϑk = 1) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N with ϑi = 1:
si(ϑi) ∈ arg min
s′i∈Si
∑
ϑ−i
fΘ(ϑ−i/ϑi)c
∑
k ϑk
i (s
′
i, s−i(ϑ−i), ϑi, ϑ−i)
(16)
where cki (s
′
i, s−i), with sl(ϑl = 0) = private, ∀l 6= i,
is the cost of driver i under profile s in the game Γ(k)
and fΘ(ϑ−i/ϑi) the posterior conditional probability of
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the active drivers given that user i is active, as derived
from the application of the Bayesian rule. Therefore, s′
minimizes the expected cost over all possible combina-
tions of the other drivers’ types and strategies so that
no active player can further lower its expected cost by
unilaterally changing her strategy.
Theorem 4.1. The Bayesian parking spot selection
game ΓB(N) has unique symmetric equilibrium profiles
pNEB = (pNEBpub , p
NEB
priv ). More specifically:
• a unique (Bayesian-Nash) pure equilibrium with
pNEBpub = 1, if pact <
σ0
N¯
,
• a unique symmetric mixed-action Bayesian Nash
equilibrium with pNEBpub =
σ0
Npact
, if pact ≥ min(σ0N , 1),
where pNEBpriv = 1− pNEBpub and σ0 ∈ R.
Proof. We present the proof in the Appendix.
4.2 Strictly incomplete information about park-
ing demand
The worst-case scenario with respect to the informa-
tion drivers avail for making their decisions is repre-
sented by the pre-Bayesian game variant. In the pre-
Bayesian parking spot selection game, the drivers may
avail some knowledge about the upper limit of the vehi-
cles that are potential competitors for parking resources,
yet their actual number is not known, not even proba-
bilistically.
Pre-Bayesian games do not necessarily have ex-post
Nash equilibria, even in mixed actions. On the other
hand, all quasi-concave pre-Bayesian games do have at
least one mixed-strategy safety-level equilibrium [6]. In
the safety-level equilibrium, every player minimizes over
her strategy set Si the worst-case (maximum) expected
cost she may suffer over all possible types and actions
of her competitors (S−i,Θ−i).
The result of interest for our pre-Bayesian variant of
the parking spot selection model ΓpB(N) is due to [6].
Proposition 4.1. An action profile a is the unique
symmetric mixed-action safety-level equilibrium of the
pre-Bayesian parking spot selection game, ΓpB(N), with
non-decreasing resource cost functions, iff a is the unique
symmetric mixed-action equilibrium of the respective strate-
gic game with deterministic knowledge of the number of
players, Γ(N).
We discuss the implications of this result for the effi-
ciency of the equilibria behaviors of the drivers in Sec-
tion 5.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 suggests that three
important factors affect the (in)efficiency of the game
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Figure 3: Social cost for N = 500 drivers when
exactly σpub drivers compete (a) or when all
drivers decide to compete with probability ppub
(b), for R = 50 public parking spots, under dif-
ferent charging policies.
equilibrium profiles. The first two are the charging pol-
icy for on-street and private parking space and their rel-
ative location, which determines the overhead parame-
ter δ of failed attempts for on-street parking space. The
third factor is the information available to the drivers
when playing the game. In the following, we illustrate
their impact on the game outcome and discuss their
implications for real systems.
For the numerical results we adopt per-time unit nor-
malized values used in the typical municipal parking
systems in big European cities [2]. The parking fee for
public space is set to cpub,s = 1 unit whereas the cost of
private parking space β ranges in (1, 16] units and the
excess cost δ in [1, 5] units. We consider various parking
demand levels assuming that private parking facilities
in the area suffice to fulfil all parking requests.
5.1 Impact of charging policy
Figure 3 plots the social costs C(σpub) under pure
(Eq. 11) and C(ppub) under mixed-action strategies as
a function of the number of competing drivers σpub and
competition probability ppub, respectively, where
C(p) = cpub,s
N∑
σ=0
(N
σ
)
pσ(1− p)N−σ ·
[min(σ,R) +max(0, σ −R)γ + (N − σ)β] (17)
Figure 3 motivates two remarks. Firstly, the social cost
curves for pure and mixed-action profiles have the same
shape. This comes as no surprise since for given N , any
value for the expected number of competing players 0 ≤
σpub ≤ N can be realized through appropriate choice of
the symmetric mixed-action profile p. Secondly, the cost
is minimized when the number of competing drivers is
equal to the number of on-street parking spots. The cost
rises when either competition exceeds the available on-
street parking capacity or drivers are overconservative
in competing for on-street parking. In both cases, the
drivers pay the penalty of the lack of coordination in
their decisions. The deviation from optimal grows faster
with increasing price differential between the on-street
and private parking space.
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Figure 4: Price of Anarchy for N = 500 and varying R, under different charging policies.
Whereas an optimal centralized mechanism would as-
sign exactly min(N,R) public parking spots to min(N,R)
drivers, if N > R, in the worst-case equilibrium the size
of drivers’ population that actually competes for on-
street parking spots exceeds the real parking capacity
by a factor σ0 which is a function of R, β and γ (equiva-
lently, δ) (see Lemma 3.1). This inefficiency is captured
in the PoA plots in Figure 4 for β and δ ranging in
[1.1, 16] and [1, 5], respectively. The plots illustrate the
following trends:
Fixed δ - varying β: For N ≤ σ0 or, equivalently,
for β ≥ δ(N−R)+RR , it holds that ϑPoAϑβ < 0 and there-
fore, the PoA is strictly decreasing in β. On the contrary,
for β < δ(N−R)+RR , the PoA is strictly increasing in β,
since ϑPoAϑβ > 0.
Fixed β - varying δ: For N ≤ σ0 or, equivalently,
for δ ≤ R(β−1)N−R we get ϑPoAϑδ > 0. Therefore, the PoA
is strictly increasing in δ. For δ > R(β−1)N−R , we get
ϑPoA
ϑδ = 0. Hence, if δ exceeds
R(β−1)
N−R , PoA is insen-
sitive to changes of the excess cost δ.
Practically, the equilibrium strategy emerging from
the current-practice parking search behavior, approxi-
mates the optimal coordinated mechanism when the op-
eration of private parking facilities accounts for drivers’
preferences as well as estimates of the typical parking
demand and supply. More specifically, if, as part of the
pricing policy, the cost of private parking is less than
δ(N−R)+R
R times the cost of on-street parking, then the
social cost in the equilibrium profile approximates the
optimal social cost as the price differential between pub-
lic and private parking decreases. This result is inline
with the statement in [19], arguing that “price differ-
entials between on-street and off-street parking should
be reduced in order to reduce traffic congestion”. Note
that the PoA metric also decreases monotonically for
high values of the private parking cost when the private
parking operator desires to gain more than δ(N−R)+RR
times the cost of on-street parking towards a bound that
depends on the excess cost δ. Nevertheless, these op-
erating points correspond to high absolute social cost,
i.e., the minimum achievable social cost is already un-
favorable due to the high fee paid by N−R drivers that
use the private parking space (see Fig. 3). On the other
hand, there are instances, as in case of R = 50 (see Fig.
4), where the value δ(N−R)+RR consists a non-realistic
option for the cost of private parking space, already for
δ > 1. Thus, contrary to the previous case, PoA only
improves as the cost for private parking decreases. Fi-
nally, for given cost of the private parking space, the
social cost can be optimized by locating the private fa-
cility in the proximity of the on-street parking spots so
that the additional travel distance is reduced and the
excess cost remains below R(β−1)N−R .
5.2 Impact of information about competition
Looking at the mixed-action equilibria, Theorem 3.2
indicates that drivers’ intention to compete for pub-
lic parking resources is shaped by the charging policy,
the number of players and the public parking capac-
ity. Indeed, players start to withdraw from competi-
tion as competition intensity rises over the threshold
σ0 =
R(γ−1)
δ . For the Bayesian implementation, the
rationale behind active players’ behavior is almost the
same. The only difference is that the players adjust
their strategies on estimations for the competition level,
based on the commonly known probabilistic informa-
tion. Therefore, the probability to compete decreases
with the expected number of competitors Npact, if this
number exceeds the threshold σ0 of the strategic games
(see Theorem 4.1). Furthermore, for both game formu-
lations, players start to renege from competition as the
distance between public and private parking facilities
(i.e., δ) is extended or the number of opportunities in
public parking decreases (i.e., R) or the price for pri-
vate parking reservation drops (i.e., β). Figure 5 depicts
the effect of these parameters on the equilibrium mixed-
action, for strategic (i.e., pact = 1) and Bayesian games
(i.e., pact ∈ {0.5, 0.7}).
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Figure 5: Probability of competing in equilib-
rium, for R = 50. Left: Strategic and Bayesian
games under fixed charging scheme β = 5, γ = 7.
Right: Strategic games under various charging
schemes β ∈ {3, 6}, γ ∈ {4, 5, 7, 8}.
Less-is-more phenomena under uncertainty:
Less intuitive are the game dynamics in its pre-Bayesian
variant, when users only avail an estimate of the maxi-
mum number of drivers that are potentially interested in
parking space. From Proposition 4.1, the mixed-action
safety-level equilibrium corresponds to the mixed action
equilibrium of the strategic game Γ(N). However, we
have seen that, when the players outnumber the on-
street parking capacity: a) the mixed-action equilib-
rium in the strategic game generates higher expected
number of competitors than the optimal value R (see
Theorem 3.2); b) the social cost conditionally increases
with the probability of competing (see Fig. 3); c) the
probability of competition decreases with the number
of players N (see Fig. 5). Therefore, at the safety-level
equilibrium of the game, the drivers end up randomiz-
ing the pure action public with a lower probability than
that corresponding to the game they actually play, with
k ≤ N players. Hence, the resulting number of compet-
ing vehicles is smaller and, cumulatively, they may end
up paying less than they would if they knew determin-
istically the competition they face.
One question that becomes relevant is for which (real)
number K of competing players do the drivers end up
paying the optimal cost. Practically, if pNEN = (p
NE
pub,N ,
pNEpriv,N ) denotes the symmetric mixed-action equilib-
rium for Γ(N), we are looking for the value of K satis-
fying:
Kppub,N = R⇒ K = RN
σ0
=
δ
γ − 1N
namely, when δγ−1N (rounded to the nearest integer)
drivers are seeking for parking space under uncertainty
conditions, in the induced equilibrium they end up pay-
ing the minimum possible cost, which is better than
what they would pay under complete information about
the parking demand.
6. RELATEDWORK
Various aspects of the broader parking space search
problem have been addressed in the literature. The
centralized systems in [9] and [28] monitor and reserve
parking places within a city and are shown to better dis-
tribute the car traffic volume. The first system consists
of four components: an on-board device located in the
vehicle, intelligent network enabled lampposts, a sensor
network that monitors the availability of parking places
and a centralized parking place scheduling/reserving ser-
vice; whereas the second architecture utilizes both the
Internet and Wi-Fi technology to realize the monitor-
ing and reservation task. Likewise, the authors in [21]
present, design, implement, and evaluate a system that
generates a real-time map of parking space availability.
The map is constructed at a central server out of aggre-
gate data about parking space occupancy, collected by
vehicles circulating in the considered area. In [20] Lu
et al. propose SPARK for reducing the parking search
delay. SPARK consists of three distinct services, i.e.,
real-time parking navigation, intelligent antitheft pro-
tection and friendly parking information dissemination,
all making use of roadside network infrastructure. On
the contrary, in [27] and [11], information about the
location and vacancy of parking spots is opportunisti-
cally disseminated among vehicles. In [27] the vehicle
nodes solve a variant of the Time-Varying Travelling
Salesman problem while dynamically planning the best
feasible trip along all (reported to be) vacant parking
spots. The proposed method is shown via simulation re-
sults to achieve near-optimal performance, yet it makes
in advance the rather debatable implication that vehi-
cles’ trip follows all reported spots. Whereas, the work
in [11] uses a topology-independent scalable information
dissemination algorithm and takes simulation measure-
ments for the profile of nodes’ cache entities, under var-
ious dissemination criteria.
Game-theoretical dimensions in general parking ap-
plications explicitly acknowledged and treated in [5], [4]
and [7]. In [5], the games are played among parking fa-
cility providers and concern the location and capacity
of their parking facility as well as which pricing struc-
ture to adopt. Whereas, in the other two works, the
strategic players are the drivers. In [4], which seeks to
provide cues for optimal parking lot size dimensioning,
the drivers decide on the arriving time at the lot, ac-
counting for their preferred time as well as their desire
to secure a space. In a work more relevant to ours,
Ayala et al. in [7] model centralized and distributed
parking spot assignment methods. The drivers exploit
(or not) information on the location of others to serve
their self-interest, that is, occupy an available parking
spot at the minimum possible travelled distance. Fi-
nally, economic effects, this time of congestion pricing,
are analyzed in [19] by Larson et al., through a queueing
model for drivers who circulate in search for on-street
parking.
Our work approaches the parking assistance service as
an instance of the more general competitive contexts in-
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troduced in Section 1. Rather than proposing a particu-
lar parking assistance scheme or algorithm, as the cited
papers of the first paragraph do, we draw our atten-
tion on fundamental determinants of the parking search
process efficiency. We formulate three variants of the
parking resource selection game (strategic, Bayesian,
and pre-Bayesian) to provide normative prescriptions
for the impact of information on drivers’s decisions. We
abstract from spatiotemporal variations of demand and
supply and consider generic yet realistic pricing schemes
for the service in question. Our expectation is that the
obtained results may be deemed relevant to a broader
class of competitive service provision scenarios3.
7. CONCLUSIONS - DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have devised game-theoretic ab-
stractions of the parking search process. Cheaper on-
street parking space and more expensive private parking
facilities are modeled as discrete resources and drivers
as strategic players that decide on whether to compete
or not for the former, under information of variable ac-
curacy. Our results dictate, sometimes counterintuitive,
conditions under which different charging policies and
information amounts for the parking demand, reduce
the inefficiency of the equilibrium strategies and favor
the social welfare. The parking assistance service con-
stitutes an instance of service provision within compet-
itive networking environments, where more information
does not necessarily improve the efficieny of service de-
livery but, even worse, may hamstring users’ efforts to
maximize their benefit. This result, obtained under the
particular full rationality assumptions, has direct prac-
tical implications since it challenges the need for more
elaborate information mechanisms and promotes cer-
tain policies for information dissemination for the ser-
vice provider.
In the remaining of this Section, we iterate on two
implicit assumptions behind the game models we intro-
duced in Sections 3 and 4, which can motivate further
research work.
Drivers’ indifference among individual parking
spots: The formulation of the parking spot selection
game assumes that drivers do not have any preference
order over the R on-street parking spots. This could be
the case when these R spots are quite close to eachother,
resulting in practically similar driving times to them
and walking times from them to the drivers’ ultimate
destinations.
When drivers avail preferences over different parking
spots, we come up with an instance of one-sided match-
ing (assignment) games. The objective then is to de-
3It is tempting to draw parallels with the way auctioning
mechanisms provide a powerful generic abstraction for treat-
ing network resource allocation problems, (i.e., spectrum
sharing, online sponsored search engines) [17].
tect an assignment that no subset of the drivers could
be better off if they exchanged their allocated spots
with eachother. At a theoretical level, the search is for
mechanisms that treat all drivers fairly, are strategy-
proof, i.e., the drivers are motivated to advertise their
true preference orders because they cannot gain by ly-
ing about them, and efficient in some Pareto-optimality
sense. The random priority and the probabilistic serial
assignment are two mechanisms that compromise these
requirements [10]; they could be incorporated nicely in
a centralized system, whereby drivers would notify the
central server about their destinations and the latter
would derive their ordinal (or cardinal) preference or-
ders and make the assignments.
Drivers’ rationality: Yet stronger and long de-
batable is the assumption that drivers do behave as
fully rational decision-makers. Full (or global) ratio-
nality demands that the drivers can exhaustively ana-
lyze the possible strategies available to themselves and
the other drivers, identify the equilibrium profile, and
take the respective actions to realize it. Simon, already
more than half a century ago [26], challenged both the
normative and descriptive capacity of the fully rational
decision-maker, arguing that human decisions, are most
often made under time, knowledge and computational
constraints and draw on simpler cognitive heuristics.
Much research work has been undertaken since then
on decision-making under bounded rationality, primarily
within the cognitive psychology community, which re-
ports experimental evidence of deviation from the global
rationality directives (see, for example, [25] for a survey)
and/or proposes relevant heuristics, e.g., [15].
Interestingly, the conclusions from these two model-
ing approaches are not necessarily in conflict and our
results exemplify this. Figure 5 illustrates that the
symmetric equilibrium probability pNEpub decreases as the
number of competing drivers grows (see the discussion
in Section 5). A similar experimental result, suggesting
that decision agents more generally tend to be less com-
petitive as the number of competitors increases, even
when the chances of success remain constant, has been
recently reported from the cognitive psychology commu-
nity in [14] under the term N-effect. The comparison of
the two decision-making modeling approaches both in
the context of the parking spot selection problem and
more general decision-making contexts, is an interesting
area worth of further exploration.
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APPENDIX
A. PURE EQUILIBRIA OF Γ(N) VIA THE
POTENTIAL FUNCTION
The game Γ(N) is a congestion game; thus, it accepts
an exact potential function Φ(·) [23]. As discussed in
Section 3, the 2N different action profiles of Γ(N) can
be grouped into N + 1 different meta-profiles (m,N −
m), 0 ≤ m ≤ N , where m is the number of drivers that
decide to compete for on-street parking. Therefore, the
potential function is effectively a function of m and can
be written as
Φ(a) ∼ Φ(m) =
∑
j∈R
nj(a)∑
k=0
wj(k) (18)
where nj(a) the number of drivers using resource j un-
der action profile a. Therefore, for m ≤ R,
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Φ(m) = (N −m)cpriv +
m∑
k=1
cpub,s
= cpub,s[βN − (β − 1)m] (19)
whereas, for m > R
Φ(m) = (N −m)cpriv +
m∑
k=1
min
(
1,
R
k
)
cpub,s +[
1−min
(
1,
R
k
)]
cpub,f (20)
= cpub,s
βN + δm−R(γ − 1) +R(1− γ) · m∑
k=R+1
1
k

= cpub,s [βN + δm−R(γ − 1) +R(1− γ) · (Hm −HR+1)]
Hn = γ + log(n) + O(1/n) is the n
th harmonic num-
ber; and γ the Euler constant. The pure NE strategies
coincide with the local minima of the potential func-
tion. For m ≤ R, ∂Φ(m)/∂m < 0 and the minimum is
obtained at m, as derived in Theorem 3.1.
For m > R, demanding ∂Φ(m)/∂m = 0 we get
δ +
R(1− γ)
mNE
= 0 (21)
which yields mNE =
R(γ−1)
δ = σ0, i.e., the value we got
through the analysis in Section 3.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
The symmetric equilibrium for N ≤ σ0 corresponds
to the pure NE we derived in Theorem 3.1. To compute
the equilibrium for N > σ0 we invoke the condition that
equilibrium profiles must fulfil
cNi (public, p
NE) = cNi (private, p
NE) (22)
namely, the costs of each pure action belonging to
the support of the equilibrium mixed-action strategy
are equal. Hence, from (14) and (22) the symmetric
mixed-action equilibrium pNE = (pNEpub , p
NE
priv) solves the
equation
f(p) = −β +
N−1∑
k=0
(γ −min(1, R
k + 1
) · (γ − 1))B(k;N − 1, p) = 0 (23)
A closed-form expression for the equilibrium pNEpub is not
straightforward. However, it holds that:
lim
p→0 f(p) = −β + 1 < 0 and limp→1 f(p) = δ(1−
σ0
N
) > 0 (24)
and f(p) is a continuous and strictly increasing function
in p since
f ′(p) =
N−1∑
k=0
(γ −min(1, R
k + 1
)(γ − 1))B′(k;N − 1, p)
>
N−1∑
k=0
B′(k;N − 1, p) = 0
Hence, f(p) has a single solution. It may be checked
with replacement that f(σ0/N) = 0.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Inline with the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3.2,
any symmetric mixed-action equilibrium pNEB must ful-
fill
c
NB
i (public, p
NEB ) = c
NB
i (private, p
NEB ) (25)
Since
c
NB
i (private, p) = cpriv
c
NB
i (public, p) =
N−1∑
nact=0
cnact+1i (public, p)B(nact;N − 1, pact)
a few algebraic manipulations suffice to derive that the
symmetric mixed-action equilibrium pNEB solves the
equation
h(p) = −β +
N−1∑
nact=0
B(nact;N − 1, pact) ·
nact∑
k=0
(γ −min( R
k + 1
, 1) · (γ − 1))B(k;nact, p) = 0
(26)
The function h(p) is continuous and strictly increas-
ing in p for all pact ∈ [0, 1] since
h′(p) =
N−1∑
nact=0
B(nact;N − 1, pact) ·
nact∑
k=0
(γ −min( R
k + 1
, 1) · (γ − 1))B′(k;nact, p)
>
N−1∑
nact=0
B(nact;N − 1, pact)
nact∑
k=0
B′(k;nact, p)
=
N−1∑
nact=0
B(nact;N − 1, pact)(
nact∑
k=0
B(k;nact, p))
′ = 0
since the weights of the rightmost Binomial coeffi-
cients in the second line are not smaller than one.
γ −min( R
k + 1
, 1) · (γ − 1) > 1, ∀k ∈ [0, N − 1]
Likewise, for pact ∈ [0, 1], its leftmost value is
lim
p→0h(p) = −β + 1 < 0 (27)
whereas its rightmost value is
lim
p→1h(p) = −β +
N−1∑
nact=0
B(nact;N − 1, pact) ·
(γ −min(1, R
nact + 1
) · (γ − 1))
= f(pact) (28)
In the proof of Theorem 3.2 we showed that the func-
tion f(p) is strictly increasing in p and has a single solu-
tion p = σ0/N . Therefore, as long as pact ∈ [0, σ0/N),
limp→1 h(p) < 0, and cNBi (public, p) < c
NB
i (private, p)
∀p ∈ (0, 1); namely, it is a dominant strategy for all
drivers to compete for on-street parking. On the con-
trary, for pact ∈ [σ0/N, 1], limp→1 h(p) gets positive val-
ues and h(p) = 0 has a single solution p = σ0Npact (can
be checked with replacement).
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